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NOTE
NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING & DR Y
DOCK CO. V. EEOC: THE FAMILY UNIT
PROTECTED FROM PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,' the United
States Supreme Court considered for the first time the issue of sex discrimina-
tion against males under Title VII.2 The Court ruled that an employer's health
plan violates Title VII if it provides pregnancy-related benefits to female
employees that are more extensive than those provided to the wives of male
employees, while providing more extensive coverage to all employees' spouses
for all other medical conditions requiring hospitalization.3 The decision in
Newport News was based on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA),' an
amendment to Title VII, which states that it is discriminatory for employers
to treat pregnancy-related conditions less favorably than other medical con-
ditions. According to the Court, the employer's health plan in Newport News
unlawfully discriminated against male employees because it afforded married
male employees less comprehensive insurance than was provided to married
female employees. The Court determined that when an employer's insurance
program covers employees' dependents, male employees have the same right
to pregnancy disability benefits for their spouses that female employees
possess.' As determined by the Newport News Court, Congress' intent in
enacting the PDA was to extend the protection of Title VII to all pregnant
women who are entitled to health benefits.' Title VII, however, expressly
applies only to employees and, therefore, would not directly protect an
employee's pregnant wife. The Court in Newport News specifically found
1. 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983).
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976), pro-
vides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer- (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
3. 103 S. Ct. at 2631-32.
4. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1980 & Supp. 11 1982),
provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt
of benefits under the fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected
but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h)
of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.
5. 103 S. Ct. at 2630-31.
6. Id. at 2627-32.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
that because employees with pregnant spouses were entitled to protection,
discrimination against their wives constituted discrimination against the
employee-husbands.'
In acknowledging that male employees are victims of an employer's
pregnancy-based discrimination, the Newport News Court rejected the test
of discrimination it had previously established in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert8 and widened the scope of Title VII's protection against discrimina-
tion. The Newport News Court viewed employees and their spouses as
inseparable husband/wife units, and expanded the number of persons pro-
tected by Title VII from losses due to uncompensated disability. The Court
realistically assessed pregnancy as a condition which affects the family pocket-
book. Moreover, by viewing an employee and his spouse as joint victims
of his employer's discriminatory actions, the Court concluded that Title VII
protects the spouse by virtue of her husband's employment relationship. The
Court's conclusion significantly expanded Title VII's protection against
discrimination.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY & JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TITLE VII
Statutory prohibitions against employment discrimination are a relatively
recent development. Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 9 in
1964 to ensure equal employment opportunities for all individuals. Title VII
prohibits discrimination on the basis of certain classifications, including
classification by sex.'" The statute mandates that private employers consider
an individual's personal capabilities, and not group stereotypes, when making
personnel decisions. Early Title VII cases dealt primarily with the urgent
discrimination problems that were identified by the civil rights movement
of the late 1960's and early 1970's." After courts had addressed blatant forms
of employment discrimination, they were able to focus on more subtle types
of discrimination. Despite the passage of Title VII, female employees con-
tinued to be regarded by employers primarily as childbearers and child rearers
who inevitably would leave their jobs once they became pregnant. 2 Because
7. Id. at 2632.
8. See infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
9. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I to -17 (1981 & Supp.
1983).
10. For the pertinent provision of Title VII, see supra note 2.
11. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (in the absence of
business necessity, an employer's refusal to hire women with pre-school-age children while hiring
men with children of the same age violated Title VII); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444
F.2d. 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (employment policy that denied opportunities because of presumed
physical limitations of women violated Title VII); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442
F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (employer's refusal to hire males as flight attendants violated Title
VII); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (employer's denial
of switchman's position to female applicant violated Title VII).
12. Employment practices such as mandatory maternity leave and termination have caused
erratic employment patterns among women. See Hearings on H.R. 3861 Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Labor on the Comm. of Labor (Public Welfare), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 142,
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courts have perpetuated this myth of women as childbearers and child
rearers,' 3 pregnancy, a potentially integral part of the female employee's
womanhood, was not protected under Title VII until 1978 when the PDA
was enacted.
When Congress enacted the PDA, it delegated supervision of Title VII
145 (1969); Note, Pregnancy Disability Benefits Denied: Narrowing the Scope of Title VII,
32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 174 (1977). For a discussion of the relationship between denial
of employment-related benefits and the incentive to work, see Comment, Love's Labors Lost:
New Conceptions of Maternity Leaves, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 260, 261 (1972).
In Cleveland v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), the Supreme Court held that mandatory
termination of pregnant public school teachers violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. According to the Court, the mandatory termination provisions amounted
to a conclusive, irrebuttable presumption that every pregnant teacher who reaches the end of
the second trimester in her pregnancy is physically incapable of performing her duties. The
Court declared that the mandatory maternity leaves swept too broadly by presuming a pregnant
worker to be incompetent. The Court found that pregnant workers are not presumptively unable
to teach, especially when the medical evidence might be to the contrary, and condemned the
lack of individual determinations of ability by the teacher's doctor or by the school board's
doctor. Id. at 644.
Justice Brennan's dissent in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), also
acknowledged this generalized presumption that pregnant women are unable to perform their
duties satisfactorily. He noted that of all employees, only pregnant women were required to
cease work at a pre-determined stage of their disability, regardless of the women's desire and
physical ability to work. Furthermore, women were required to remain off the job for a pre-
determined period after childbirth. Id. at 149-50 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Newport
News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 375 F. Supp. 367, 385 (E.D. Va. 1974)).
The Supreme Court, however, has not been reluctant to strike down statutes which employ
similar conclusive or irrebuttable presumptions. See, e.g., Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S.
628 (1974) (statute that presumed illegitimacy of child and therefore barred child from receiving
disability benefits violated fifth and fourteenth amendment due process); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972) (statute which presumed, without a hearing, that an unwed father was
unfit for custody of his child was violative of due process clause of fourteenth amendment);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (statute authorizing suspension of driver's license and vehi-
cle registration of individual involved in accident, without hearing to determine possible fault,
violated procedural due process).
13. The perpetuation of this myth is illustrated by the Supreme Court's decisions in Geduldig
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), and General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). In
both decisions, the Court refused to recognize that pregnant women should be treated primari-
ly as workers and that pregnancy should be compensated as any other temporary disability
is compensated. See Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975
SuP. CT. REv. 1, 10 (the analogy of pregnancy to other temporary disabilities was rejected
because the Supreme Court viewed childbirth not as a short-term medical condition, but as
a long-term process ending only when childrearing is completed).
The conception of women primarily as wives and mothers is deeply rooted in the American
tradition. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (upholding the
Illinois Supreme Court's refusal to allow women to practice law). According to the Bradwell
Court:
The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine or-
dinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that
which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. . ..
. . . The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
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issues' 4 to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and
authorized the EEOC to promulgate guidelines interpreting Title VII
provisions.'" Although the EEOC guidelines do not carry the force of law,' 6
early Title VII decisions accorded great deference to the agency's
interpretations.' 7 In 1972, the EEOC promulgated a guideline for pregnancy-
related disabilities. 8 This guideline indicated that employment practices that
adversely affect female employees because of their pregnancy-related
conditions constituted disparate treatment based on sex. The guideline fur-
ther indicated that any pregnancy-related disability should be regarded as
a temporary disability under health and sick leave plans. With few
exceptions,' 9 the lower federal courts adhered to this guideline."0
CONG. & AD. NEws 4749, 4751, and in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINA-
TION ACT OF 1978, at 147, 149 (1979) (remarks of Rep. Perkins) ("As testimony received by
this committee demonstrates, the assumption that women will become pregnant and leave the
labor force leads to the view of women as marginal workers, and is at the root of the
discriminatory practices which keep women in low-paying and dead-end jobs.").
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1980 & Supp. 1983).
15. Id. at § 2000e-12a.
16. See S. AGID, FAIR EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION, PROVING AND DEFENDING A TITLE VII CASE
516 (2d ed. 1979). Title VII does not grant the EEOC formal rule-making authority. Therefore,
although EEOC guidelines are usually promulgated in accordance with the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, they are not entitled to the presumption of validity given to formal government
regulations such as Civil Service Commission regulations. Id.
17. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (enforcing agency's
administrative interpretation of Title VII is entitled to great deference); Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. 1, 16 (1964) (when faced with an issue of statutory construction, the Court shows great
deference to interpretations by the agency charged with its administration); Grubbs v. Butz,
514 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (agency regulations are usually presumed valid unless inconsis-
tent with the statute under which they were enacted).
18. The EEOC guidelines on pregnancy discrimination, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1972), pro-
vide in pertinent part:
(a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes from employ-
ment applicants or employees because of pregnancy, childbirth and related medical
conditions is in prima facie violation of Title VII.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion,
childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary
disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary disability
insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment. Written and
unwritten employment policies and practices involving matters such as the com-
mencement and duration of leave, the availability of extensions, the accrual of seniori-
ty and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement, and payment under any health
or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan, formal or informal, shall be
applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and condi-
tions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities.
Id.
19. See, e.g., Newmon v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 238, 245 (N.D. Ga. 1973)
(pregnancy found to be neither a sickness nor a disability, therefore denial of disability benefits
for pregnancy did not violate Title VII), aff'd, 475 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1973).
20. See Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974) (disability plan
which excluded pregnancy but included "voluntary" disabilities, such as sports injuries, held
[Vol. 33:545
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Although the 1972 guideline attempted to promote equality for pregnant
women in the workplace, the concept of pregnancy as a family matter under
employment health plans had not yet evolved. Accordingly, the early Supreme
Court cases addressing pregnancy issues failed to recognize pregnancy
discrimination as an aspect of sex discrimination." Furthermore, these deci-
sions did not recognize pregnancy as a family matter. In fact, even after
the guideline was promulgated, the Supreme Court maintained an archaic
attitude toward pregnancy in the workplace.
The 1974 Supreme Court decision in Geduldig v. Aiello "2 limited the
usefulness of the EEOC guideline and the scope of Title VII. In Aiello, the
Court upheld a state's temporary disability insurance program which excluded
benefits for normal pregnancies. Ignoring Title VII principles, the Court used
an equal protection analysis2" to conclude that a disability program that
excluded pregnancy-related coverage had classified pregnant women in a
manner substantially related to a legitimate state purpose.24 Applying a tradi-
tional scrutiny test," the Court found that the state interest in maintaining
a low-cost benefits system which adequately compensated other disabilities
outweighed the interest in providing coverage for the female employees'
unlawful), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 374 F. Supp.
1056 (D. Or. 1974) (school board's refusal to treat pregnancy as a temporary disability under
sick-leave policy violated Title VII and fourteenth amendment), aff'd, 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir.
1975), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977) (remanded for further consideration in light
of Gilbert); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (disability
plan which included all disabilities except pregnancy held unlawful), aff'd, 511 F.2d 199 (3d
Cir. 1975) vacated on jurisdictional grounds and remanded with instructions to dismiss appeal,
424 U.S. 737 (1976); Bravo v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (pregnancy
must be treated the same as illness for purposes of sick pay and seniority), rev'd mem., 525
F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1975); Farkas v. South Western City School Dist., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 288 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (school board violated Title VII by requiring teacher to take un-
paid leave of absence for maternity instead of allowing her to use accumulated sick leave);
Lillo v. Plymouth Local Bd. of Educ., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 21 (N.D. Ohio 1973)
(denial of sick leave to pregnant teacher violated Title VII); Dessenberg v. American Metal
Forming Co., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 290 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (school board's grant
of sick leave for all disabilities except pregnancy violated Title VII); see also Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 260, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 128 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1974) (period of fifty-two weeks leave designated for other disabilities must supersede
pregnancy leave period of six weeks where necessary).
21. See infra notes 22-67 and accompanying text.
22. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
23. Id. at 494-95.
24. Id. at 494-97.
25. The traditional or minimal scrutiny test requires a defendant to show a rational rela-
tionship between the challenged enactment and a legitimate state purpose. See, e.g., Hoyt v.
Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (statute exempting women from compulsory jury duty rationally
related to the legitimate state interest of protecting women's central role as homemaker); Goessaert
v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (statute forbidding women from being bartenders rationally
related to legitimate interest of reducing moral and social problems); Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908) (statute limiting women's workday to ten hours rationally related to legitimate
state interest of protecting women from overwork).
In Aiello, the standard used to test the validity of classification was a matter of controversy
1984]
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pregnancy-related disabilities.2" Thus, the Court concluded that excluding
disabilities associated with normal pregnancies was permissible. 7
The Aiello Court, in an infamous footnote, "8 rebutted the dissent's
between the majority and dissenting opinions. The majority used a "traditional rational rela-
tionship" test because it determined that pregnancy was not a gender classification. 417 U.S.
at 496. The dissent viewed pregnancy as a suspect sex classification and would have applied
a strict scrutiny test. The strict scrutiny test would require the state to prove that the regulation
served a compelling state interest which could not be achieved by less drastic means. Id. at
498, 502-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Noting that stricter standards had been applied in the
past for gender classifications, the dissent urged adoption of a stricter standard of judicial
scrutiny for gender classifications than that generally accorded economic or social welfare pro-
grams. Id. at 502-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)).
26. 417 U.S. at 496.
27. Id. at 494.
28. Because it was the basis for the Court's decision in Aiello, footnote 20 is presented
in its entirety:
The dissenting opinion to the contrary, this case is thus a far cry from cases like
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973),
involving discrimination based on gender as such. The California insurance pro-
gram does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely
removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities.
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that
every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like
those considered in Reed, supra, and Frontiero, supra. Normal pregnancy is an
objectively identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics. Absent a show-
ing that distinctions involving pregnancy are merely pretexts designed to effect an
invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers
are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legisla-
tion such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical
condition. The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such
under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The
program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women and non-
pregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes
members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus ac-
crue to members of both sexes.
417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20.
The Aiello Court divided potential disability insurance recipients into two groups. Because
women were included in both the group that received benefits and the group that did not receive
benefits, the Court determined that there was no sex discrimination.
Relying on this footnote, the Court in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976),
divided the class of women into pregnant women and non-pregnant women. Thus, the Court
was able to find that the employer's plan, which excluded pregnancy from an otherwise in-
clusive plan, discriminated against pregnancy rather than sex. Because pregnancy was not pro-
tected by Title VII, the Court found no Title VII violation.
Shortly after the Gilbert decision, Congress passed the PDA. The PDA made it clear that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was discrimination on the basis of sex. Hence, the
Aiello/Gilbert method of classification was rendered obsolete. Because the classification adopted
in footnote 20 was the basis for two decisions which perpetuated pregnancy-based discrimina-
tion, and because Congress quickly and explicitly rejected that classification, footnote 20 in
Aiello may now be regarded as "infamous."
[Vol. 33:545
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argument29 in favor of applying the heightened level of scrutiny which is
commonly utilized in cases involving gender-based discrimination.3" Denying
that pregnancy was per se a sex-based classification,3' the Court declared
that the California state insurance plan did not discriminate against all
women, but only against those who had a certain physical condition-'
pregnancy. Although the Court acknowledged that only women can become
pregnant, it stated that exclusion of coverage for pregnancy was not sex-
based discrimination. 2 Accordingly, the Court found that pregnancy was
a classification based on disability, not gender, and concluded that the
employer had not violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.33 The Court's reasoning threatened to completely remove
pregnancy classifications from the scope of sex discrimination.3
Since Title VII had its own analytical standards, the Aiello Court's equal
29. 417 U.S. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent condemned the departure from
the higher standard of review previously applied to gender cases. According to Justice Bren-
nan, the majority did not adequately explain the distinction between the gender-based classification
in the California plan and the classifications found unconstitutional in Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 417 U.S. at 498 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). The dissent warned that the Court's decision was a step backward toward "tradi-
tional" equal protection analysis, which upheld classifications that discriminted against women
solely on the basis of sex. Id. at 503 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The dissent further stated that gender classifications must be considered as suspect classifica-
tions, and therefore, should be subject to strict scrutiny. To survive strict scrutiny, a challenged
statute must serve an overriding or compelling interest that cannot be served by less drastic
means. According to Justice Brennan, the state failed to meet that burden in Aiello. The state's
justification for excluding pregnancy coverage was that such coverage would be too expensive.
Id. at 504 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Financial considerations, however, can not be used to
justify invidious discrimination between males and females. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969)). As Justice Brennan explained, the state must
do more than prove that the denial of benefits to the excluded class saves money. In addition,
Justice Brennan suggested that the state's financial concerns could have been alleviated through
less drastic, non-discriminatory means. Id. at 505 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
noted that the increased costs of providing pregnancy benefits could be accommodated easily
by changing other variables that affected the viability of the program, such as contribution
rate and maximum benefits allowable. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Aiello v. Hansen,
359 F. Supp. 792, 798 (N.D. Cal. 1973)).
30. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (federal statute that permitted
male Air Force officers to claim wives as dependents for benefits purposes, while prohibiting
female officers from claiming husbands as dependents, found, under strict scrutiny, to be a
classification based on sex in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (under strict scrutiny, state probate code that arbitrarily
gave males preference for appointment as administrators of estates violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment).
31. 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20; see supra note 18.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 496-97.
34. The Aiello threat ultimately was eliminated by the enactment of the PDA. If, however,
the Aiello decision still controlled sex discrimination in employment issues, then pregnancy
classifications would be completely removed from Title VII protection. Without Title VlI pro-
tection, the same unsupportable assumptions about women that underlie sex-based discrimina-
tion would underlie discrimination based on pregnancy. If an equal protection analysis still
1984]
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protection analysis had little precedential value in Title VII litigation." Never-
theless, the Court's adamant refusal to recognize pregnancy as a sex-based
classification would ordinarily be followed by lower courts, regardless of
whether a case was brought under Title VII or the fourteenth amendment.
The Aiello Court's reasoning, however, created confusion among the lower
courts for two reasons. First, it deemed pregnancy not to be sex-related,
even though the ability to bear children is the clearest biological distinction
between women and men. Second, while the Court removed pregnancy as
a line of demarcation between the sexes, it suggested no viable criteria by
which to determine the presence or absence of sex discrimination.
The confusion engendered by the Aiello decision underscored the need for
a more incisive analysis in pregnancy discrimination cases than the analysis
used by the Supreme Court. After the Aiello decision, six appellate courts
heard Title VII cases involving pregnancy discrimination and rejected the
Court's reasoning. 36 By applying a Title VII disparate treatment test, these
appellate courts avoided the Aiello precedent. 7 The circuit courts analogized
were to be used, discriminatory pregnancy-based classifications would only be eradicated if
they were subjected to the same level of scrutiny given other classifications base on sex. See
generally Bartlett, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV.
1532 (1974) (Aiello not only threatens the level of constitutional protection extended to sex
discrimination, it also encourages classification on the basis of single-sex characteristics in the
private employment sector under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.)
35. The constitutional standard for finding discrimination differs from the various Title
VII standards for finding discrimination. For a discussion of the difference between these stan-
dards, see infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
36. See Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975) (sick leave benefits), aff'd
in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School
Dist., 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975) (sick leave benefits), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1033
(1977) (remanded for further consideration in light of Gilbert); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975) (disability plan), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Tyler v. Vickery,
517 F.2d 1089, 1097-100 (5th Cir. 1975) (dictum used as support to reject the equating of
Title VI1 with the fourteenth amendment), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976); Communication
Workers of Am. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975) (disability plan),
vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977) (remanded for further consideration in light of
Gilbert); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975) (disability plan and
sick leave benefits), vacated on jurisdictional grounds and remanded with instructions to dismiss
appeal, 424 U.S. 737 (1976). General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133-46, decided in
the wake of Aiello, repudiated the conclusion of the six courts of appeals that had considered
the question.
37. Because the standard to determine whether sex discrimination exists under Title VII
differs from the standard under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
six courts found that Aiello did not control Title VII issues. See Note, Discrimination Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 13 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 813, 821 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Discrimination Under Title VII]. For a
Title VII violation to exist, a classification must be found which is discriminatory on its face
(a prima facie or disparate treatment violation), which is a mere pretext designed to effect
invidious discrimination (intent required) or which has a discriminatory effect (intent not required).
Under an equal protection analysis, a classification must be found which is discriminatory on
its face or which is a mere pretext designed to effect invidious discrimination (intent required).
Claims made under the equal protection clause must meet a heavier burden of proof than
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a temporary pregnancy-related disability to any other temporary disability.
These courts found disparate treatment on the basis of sex if the employer
treated a temporary disability due to pregnancy or childbirth less favorably
than other temporary disabilities." Consequently, because Aiello was decided
on equal protection grounds, lower courts were not prevented from finding
Title VII violations under the disparate treatment test when employment
pregnancy classifications were involved.
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert39 was ostensibly"0 the first pregnancy
discrimination case to be decided by the Supreme Court under Title VI. 4 "
Nevertheless, the Gilbert Court adhered to the Aiello analysis and held that
a private employer's disability insurance plan which excluded pregnancy
benefits was not discriminatory under Title VII. Because the term "sex
discrimination" was left undefined by Congress when it enacted Title VII,
the Court examined the meaning of "sex discrimination" to determine
whether it encompassed pregnancy discrimination."2 The Court found that
it did not include pregnancy discrimination, that there was no Title VII viola-
tion, and that there was no need for further Title VII analysis. Accordingly,
the Gilbert Court based its decision on Aiello's equal protection analysis
and concluded that the exclusion of pregnancy from disability insurance
coverage was based on a physical condition, not on gender."3 The Gilbert
Court reiterated the Aiello Court's conclusion that the appropriate comparison
was between pregnant women and non-pregnant persons. The Court found
that General Electric's plan was prima facie neutral" because, aside from
pregnancy coverage, there was no discrepancy between its coverage for males
and females. The Court stated that absent a showing of either gender-based
discrimination or gender-based effect, there can be no discrimination on the
basis of sex and, therefore, no Title VII violation. Thus, the Court found
it unnecessary to analyze the case under Title VII.4 5
those made under Title VII because the equal protection analysis requires proof of intent while
the Title VII analysis does not. Consequently, a classification may meet the standards for violation
under Title VII but fall short of the standards required by the fourteenth amendment. Id.
38. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 384 (2d ed. 1983).
39. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
40. The Gilbert Court acknowledged that the suit was brought under Title VII rather than
the equal protection clause. Id. at 136.
41. The plaintiffs alleged that the employer's plan violated Title VII because it excluded
only pregnancy disabilities. The trial and appellate courts heard Gilbert as a Title VII case.
The district court held that the exclusion of pregnancy benefits from the otherwise all-inclusive
disability plan violated Title VII. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va.
1974). The court of appeals affirmed in Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.
1975). The Fourth Circuit ruled that Aiello was not applicable in a Title VII context, but it
acknowledged the Aiello conclusion, that disparity in treatment between pregnancy-related and
other disabilities was not sex discrimination under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
42. 429 U.S. at 133.
43. Id. at 135.
44. Id. at 136.
45. Id. at 140.
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Consequently, the Gilbert Court failed to employ either of the two analyses
appropriate in Title VII cases: the disparate treatment or the discriminatory
impact analysis. The disparate treatment analysis" determines whether an
employee was treated differently from other similarly situated employees on
the basis of sex. Under this theory, the Gilbert Court could have concluded
that the General Electric plan treated employees differently on the basis of
pregnancy and, therefore, treated them discriminatorily on the basis of sex.
The Court avoided this analysis by following Aiello and denying that
pregnancy discrimination amounted to sex discrimination. Thus, the Court
was able to conclude that General Electric's plan was neutral on its face.' 7
The Gilbert Court also circumvented the discriminatory impact analysis
which determines whether an employment practice or policy, though neutral
on its face, is discriminatory in its effect. In its 1971 decision of Griggs
v. Duke Power Co.," the Court enunciated the following effects test: if the
effect of a facially neutral plan is to discriminate against members of a class,
it will amount to a violation of Title VII." The Gilbert Court mentioned
the Griggs effects test, but did not truly apply it to the General Electric
plan3 ' because the Court neglected to examine the disabilities excluded from
the plan; these disabilities resulted in a discriminatory effect on females.
Rather, the Court focused solely on a comparison of included disabilities."
By failing to apply Title VII principles, the Gilbert Court expressly declined
46. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
47. 429 U.S. at 135.
48. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (although neutral on its face, employment practice of requir-
ing either a high school diploma or a passing grade on an intelligence test had invidious impact
by disqualifying a disproportionate number of blacks).
49. The Griggs Court introduced its effects test with the following language:
[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment pro-
cedures or testing mechanisms that operate as built-in headwinds for minority groups
and are unrelated to measuring job capability. . . . Congress directed the thrust
of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motiva-
tion. More than that, Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing
that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment
in question.
401 U.S. at 432 (emphasis in original).
50. 429 U.S. at 137.
51. Id. at 137-40. As was later recognized in Newport News, it is inappropriate to compare
only those disabilities included in a plan to determine whether they are identical for both males
and females. 103 S. Ct. 2622, 2630-31 (1983). A comparison of coverages excluded, as well
as those included, would have revealed that under General Electric's plan women were disad-
vantaged by the different coverage they received: they were not covered for pregnancy, the
most prevalent of the female work-related disabilities. The plan included no comparable exclu-
sion for men; males were covered for all of their work-related disabilities. Thus, under a proper
application of the Griggs effects test, sex discrimination would inevitably have been found to
exist in General Electric's plan because, although it was not discriminatory on its face, the
plan had an adverse impact on females as a class. The Gilbert Court instead followed the
Aiello analysis and examined only the disabilities included in the plan. 429 U.S. at 138-39.
Finding that the included disabilities were identical for males and females, the Court concluded
that there was no gender discrimination evident in the impact of the benefits plan. Id. For
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to defer to the EEOC guideline. 2 The Gilbert Court's refusal to follow the
guideline reflected a departure from the deference courts had traditionally
accorded the EEOC when deciding Title VII cases. Hence, by following
Aiello, the Court ignored the pronouncements of an agency charged with
interpreting discrimination issues.
While the Gilbert majority turned its back on the agency interpretations
of discrimination, the dissenting opinions reflected the views that prevailed
in Congress when the PDA was enacted. Justice Brennan disagreed with the
Court's conclusion that there was no discrimination under Title VII because
all employees could collect on the included risks. According to Justice
Brennan, the majority's reasoning disregarded any adverse effect the plan
might have on a group with a unique uncovered risk of disability. 3 Justice
Brennan noted that although General Electric's plan protected male employees
against all risks they might incur,"' the plan failed to offer female employees
protection against all risks they might incur by virtue of their gender. The
Gilbert majority agreed with General Electric's assertion that prohibitive costs
a bar graph which illustrates the risk-inclusion and -exclusion concepts, see Comment, Differential
Treatment of Pregnancy in Employment: The Impact of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert and
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 717, 730 (1978).
52. To justify its refusal to defer to the EEOC guideline, the Gilbert Court focused on
the eight year interval between the enactment of Title VII and the promulgation of the guideline.
429 U.S. at 142. The Court also noted that the guideline was inconsistent with a 1966 opinion
letter from the EEOC's General Counsel, stating that because pregnancy is a temporary, female-
unique disability, employees' benefits programs that exclude long-term pregnancy disability
coverage would not violate Title VII. Id. Finally, the Court recognized that the guideline con-
flicted with the Equality Pay Act, 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1975), that interpreted the Bennett
Amendment to Title VII (110 CONG. REc. 13,647 (1964)). The regulation provided that if employer
contributions to an insurance plan are equal for men and women, an accrual of benefits that
is greater for one sex than for the other would not violate the Equal Pay Act. 429 U.S. at
144-45.
In determining the deference to be accorded the EEOC guideline, the Gilbert Court looked
to the standards set forth in Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944). The Skidmore decision
held that the weight accorded an interpretive ruling such as the EEOC guideline depends on
"the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade,
if lacking power to control." 323 U.S. at 141-42. Since the EEOC guideline did not meet all
the Skidmore standards, the Gilbert Court concluded that it did not deserve judicial deference.
429 U.S. at 142.
53. 429 U.S. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan criticized the majority for
focusing on the scope of risk-inclusion and ignoring the risk-exclusion factor. Id. at 153-55
(Brennan, J., dissenting). If the risks excluded from a plan are not examined, it is impossible
to discover the plan's discriminatory effect. The exclusion of a disability that is peculiar to
women benefits one sex over the other. The result is a plan with unequal coverage.
According to Justice Brennan, the Court's failure to examine the total effect of the disability
plan was an unjustified departure from appropriate Title VII analysis. Id. at 160 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Title VII was intended to equalize employment opportunity among all individuals.
If the general effect of a disability plan is discriminatory, it violates Title VII, regardless of
intent. For further discussion of Justice Brennan's dissent, see Note, Discrimination Under
Title VII, supra note 37, at 824-25.
54. 429 U.S. 125, 152 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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prevented coverage of every possible disability." Justice Brennan observed,
however, that there was no indication that General Electric's choice to exclude
pregnancy, rather than some other less controversial disability, was founded
on a neutral assessment of the risks." The plan demonstrated a sex-conscious
process of including insurance for some risks and excluding it for others,
rather than a sex-neutral determination of coverage." Therefore, Justice
Brennan condemned the plan as one which perpetuated the secondary status
of females in the company's labor force. 8
Justice Brennan also objected to the majority's use of the equal protec-
tion standard for determining discrimination in lieu of, or interchangeably
with, the Title VII standard. 9 Justice Brennan declared that the Court's
implication that the fourteenth amendment analysis must be used instead
of Title VII conflicted with cases decided prior to Gilbert.60 Invoking
Washington v. Davis,6 ' he asserted that the constitutional standard for
adjudicating claims of invidious discrimination is not identical to the standards
applicable in a Title VII case. 62 Stressing that the Gilbert majority should
have kept the standards distinct and used the Title VII analysis, Justice
Brennan prophetically referred to the Court's analysis as "fleeting dictum." '6 3
Justice Stevens also disapproved of the constitutional analysis in Gilbert.
He declared that the constitutional holding of Aiello should not control the
issue presented in Gilbert." According to Justice Stevens, the Court should
have framed the issue as one requiring statutory construction: does an
employee's benefits program, which treats pregnancy differently than other
disabilities, discriminate against certain individuals because of their sex, in
violation of Title VII?P Because the majority did not utilize a Title VII
analysis to examine the facially neutral criteria for a discriminatory effect,
pregnancy was found to be nondiscriminatorily excluded from the plan.
55. Although the majority opinion did not directly state that prohibitive costs prevented
coverage of all possible disabilities, it cited statistics demonstrating that inclusion of pregnancy
benefits would increase employers' costs by a large, though indeterminable, amount. Thus,
the majority indicated that burdensome expense might be a valid justification for the exclusion
of pregnancy benefits. Id. at 130-31.
56. Justice Brennan indicated that the employer's concern regarding pregnancy and its lack
of concern regarding other sex-linked disabilities demonstrated that the implementation of the
plan was motivated by a discriminatory attitude toward women. 429 U.S. at 153 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (quoting with approval Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 383
(E.D. Va. 1974)).
57. 429 U.S. at 153 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 153-54 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). For a discussion of Washington, see infra note 68.
62. 426 U.S. at 238-39.
63. 429 U.S. at 154 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan foresaw that, because
of the Court's confusion of constitutional and statutory standards, Gilbert would have only
limited precedential value.
64. Id. at 160-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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According to Justice Stevens, this impermissibly placed pregnancy in a class
by itself." He concluded that because it is the female's ability to bear off-
spring which primarily distinguishes her from the male, the exclusion
necessarily discriminated on the basis of sex and should have been found
to be violative of Title VII. 6 1
The Aiello and Gilbert analyses confused the Title VII standards of
discrimination with the fourteenth amendment standards. 8 The weak
analysis 69 in Gilbert prompted Congress to enact the PDA in 1978.11 The
PDA provides that Title VII protections apply to pregnancy-related condi-
tions, and that women should be treated the same as any other disabled
person with the same ability or inability to work." Although the PDA was
intended specifically to address the problem presented by the Gilbert
decision," Congress left the issue of spousal pregnancy coverage, tentatively
66. Id. at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 162 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. Interestingly, just six months prior to its decision in Gilbert, the Court in Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), reaffirmed that equal protection and Title VII standards are
not identical and are not to be confused in application. In Washington, black plaintiffs, who
were rejected as prospective police officers because of low scores on a verbal skills test, were
denied relief under the equal protection standard. The Court found that the required tests were
not intended to discriminate against blacks, but instead were intended to upgrade employee
competence. The Court held that without a discriminatory intent, the test's disproportionately
negative impact on blacks did not violate the fourteenth amendment. According to the Washington
Court, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit erroneously applied Title VII standards in
a case which should have been decided on constitutional grounds. To find a violation under
the constitutional standard, a discriminatory purpose, as well as a discriminatory impact, must
be proven. In Washington, it was determined that since no discriminatory intent was proven,
there was no equal protection violation, and application of the statutory Title VII standard
should not be extended to the field of public employment without legislative action. 426 U.S.
at 238-48.
69. For discussions of Aiello and Gilbert which conclude that the decisions were anomalous
at best, see Larson, Sex Discrimination as to Maternity Benefits, 1975 DUKE L.J. 805; Comment,
Differential Treatment of Pregnancy in Employment: The Impact of General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 717 (1978); Note, Employ-
ment Discrimination-Corporate Paternity Responsibility: Reverse Discrimination Under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act - Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Lockheed Missles
[sic] and Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982), 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1031 [hereinafter cited
as Note, Employment Discrimination]; Note, Income Protection for Pregnant Workers, 26 DRAKE
L. REV. 389 (1977); Note, Pregnancy Disability Benefits, 91 HARV. L. REV. 241 (1977); Note,
Pregnancy Disability Benefits Denied: Narrowing the Scope of Title VI, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV.
173 (1977); Recent Decision, Exclusion of Pregnancy-Related Disabilities from Benefit Eligibility
Under Employer Disability Plan Does Not Constitute Sex Discrimination Violative of Title VII
of 1964 Civil Rights Act, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 313 (1977).
70. Congressional objection to Gilbert was so strong that bills were introduced in both the
House and the Senate to amend Title VII to include specifically pregnancy-based discrimina-
tion in its sex discrimination proscriptions. H.R. 6075, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC.
H3093 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1977) (replacing H.R. 5055, 95th Cong. 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc.
7540 (1977)); S. 995, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. Rac. 7540 (1977). The Senate bill was
passed in September 1977. S. 995, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 29,664-65 (1977).
71. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1980 & Supp. II 1982).
For the text of the PDA, see supra note 4.
72. Senator Bayh, one of the original sponsors of S. 995, which became the PDA, stated
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raised during the debates," to be resolved by litigation." The Supreme Court
first interpreted the PDA in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.
v. EEOC. "
THE NEWPORT NEWS DECISION
Newport News represented the Supreme Court's initial recognition of
pregnancy as a family-related matter in the employment benefits context.
The Court sought to protect those economically involved in a pregnancy-
both the husband and his wife. While the PDA expressly protects women
from pregnancy-related employment discrimination, the Newport News Court
extended PDA protection to the entire family unit by mandating that
employers recognize the male employee's economic responsibility to his
unborn child. Under this new family unit concept, a male employee must
be compensated for his wife's pregnancy when full coverage is provided for
female employees.
Facts and Procedural History
The Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company's disability plan
initially provided ostensibly identical coverage for its male and female
employees. The two groups did not, however, receive equal coverage because
the plan provided full coverage only for those risks common to both males
and females. For example, while male employees were subject to no sex-
that the legislation was necessitated by the "unfortunate decision" in General Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 123 CONG. REC. 29,641 (1977); see also id. at 29,664 (statement
by Sen. Brooke that Congress must act immediately to correct the "inequity and disastrous
consequences of Gilbert"); id. at 29,663 (statement by Sen. Culver that Gilbert must be reversed
to "help women and their families who will be forced to suffer severe economic and social
consequences"); id. at 29,661 (statement by Sen. Cranston that bill was introduced in response
to the "disappointing" decision in Gilbert); id. at 29,660 (statement by Sen. Biden that the
Supreme Court made it clear that the only way that pregnancy discrimination will not continue
is for Congress to make such discrimination clearly illegal); id. at 29,657 (statement by Sen.
Williams that the legislation deals with discrimination that the Supreme Court would permit
under the Civil Rights Act); id. at 26,650 (statement by Sen. Hatch that purpose of the bill
is to reverse Gilbert).
73. The issue of pregnancy coverage for employees' dependents was raised during the Con-
gressional debates on the PDA. 123 CONG. REC. 29,642, 29,643-44, 29,663 (1977). It must be
emphasized, however, that the legislative history focused on effectively reversing Gilbert, so
that working women would no longer suffer sex discrimination because of pregnancy-related
disabilities. For a discussion of Congress' intent regarding the applicability of the PDA to spousal
coverage, see infra notes 131-45 and accompanying text.
74. [T]he basic purpose of this bill is to protect women employees, it does not alter
the basic principles of Title VII law as regards sex discrimination. Rather, this
legislation clarifies the definition of sex discrimination for Title VII purposes. There-
fore the question in regard to dependents' benefits would be determined on the basis
of existing Title VII principles.
S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 n.16 (1977), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978, at 38, 43 (1979).
75. 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983).
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specific coverage exclusions, the plan excluded hospitalization coverage for
pregnancy.7" After the PDA was enacted, the company amended its insurance
plan to allow equal hospitalization and surgical coverage for male and female
employees for all medical disabilities, including pregnancy. The plan, however,
limited coverage of spouses' pregnancies to $500 of the hospitalization costs
for an uncomplicated delivery.77 As a result, if a normal delivery cost more
than $500, a male employee would not receive full reimbursement and,
therefore, would receive less employment compensation for his wife's
disability than a female employee would receive for her husband's
disabilities. M
The amended insurance plan contravened new EEOC guidelines that were
issued before the amended plan became effective. Guideline 21 states that
in situations where the employer has provided coverage for dependents, the
medical expenses of the spouses of both male and female employees must
be covered equally;79 the guideline expressly declares that this includes
pregnancy-related conditions. Guideline 22 reaffirms guideline 21 by stating
that an employer need not provide spousal medical coverage, but if any
spousal coverage is provided, then female spouses are entitled to pregnancy-
related benefits at the same level of coverage afforded' to male spouses for
76. Id. at 2624-25.
77. Id. at 2625.
78. Id. (citing with approval Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d
448, 449 (4th Cir. 1982)).
79. The Final Interpretive Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. 3804-08 (1979), were set forth in the
form of questions:
21. Q. Must an employer provide health insurance coverage for the rqedical expenses
of pregnancy-related conditions of the spouse of male employees? Of the dependents
of all employees?
A. Where an employer provides no coverage for dependents, the employer is not
required to institute such coverage. However, if an employer's insurance program
covers the medical expenses of spouses of female employees, then it must equally
cover the medical expenses of spouses of male employees, including those arising
from pregnancy-related conditions.
22. Q. Must an employer provide the same level of health insurance coverage for
the pregnancy-related medical conditions of the spouses of male employees as it
provides for its female employees?
A. No. It is not necessary to provide the same level of coverage for the pregnancy-
related medical condition of spouses of male employees as for female employees.
However, where the employer provides coverage for the medical conditions of the
spouses of its employees, then the level of coverage for pregnancy-related medical
conditions of the spouses of male employees must be the same as the level of coverage
for all other medical conditions of the spouses of female employees. For example,
if the employer covers employees for 100 percent of reasonable and customary
expenses sustained for a medical condition, but only covers dependent spouses for
50 percent of reasonable and customary expenses for their medical conditions, the
pregnancy-related expenses of the male employee's spouse must be covered at the
50 percent level.
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their medical disabilities." These guidelines make it evident that, under the
EEOC's interpretation, the Newport News plan would violate Title VII.
On September 20, 1979, John McNulty, a male employee of Newport News,
together with the United Steelworkers of America, American Federation of
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations-Central Labor Council (AFL-
CIO-CLC), filed charges with the EEOC alleging that Newport News had
unlawfully refused to provide full insurance coverage for his wife's
hospitalization during her pregnancy." Essentially, the charges sought en-
forcement of EEOC guidelines 21 and 22. Newport News sought a perma-
nent injunction barring enforcement of the EEOC guidelines and a declaratory
judgment regarding the legality of its disability insurance plan.2 Subsequently,
the EEOC filed a civil action against Newport News, alleging discrimination
of the basis of sex against male employees in its provision of pregnancy
hospitalization benefits.83
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found
that the EEOC guidelines, while entitled to consideration in determining
legislative intent, did not have the force of law.8 The court refused to enforce
the guidelines on the grounds that: (1) they directly contradicted the Gilbert
definition of sex discrimination; (2) they were contrary to the express con-
gressional intent regarding the PDA; and (3) the EEOC had previously con-
tradicted itself in interpreting Title VII provisions. 5 Consequently, Newport
News's request for injunctive relief was granted. The court also granted
declaratory relief to Newport News, reasoning that the employer's insurance
plan was lawful because the PDA altered the Gilbert decision only to the
extent that it required pregnancy-related disablility coverage for pregnant
employees and applicants for employment, but not for employees' spouses.86
Despite acknowledging that the issue of pregnancy benefits for dependents
had arisen in floor debates, the court stressed that Congress left that issue
to be decided in accordance with existing Title VII principles,87 which had
not been explicitly extended to spousal pregnancy-related disabilities by either
Congress or the courts. Consequently, the court found that the Newport
News plan neither constituted gender-based discrimination nor resulted in
the discriminatory effect required for a Title VII violation8 because the case
did not involve a female employee's pregnancy. Thus, the court declared
80. Id.
81. Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 510 F. Supp. 66, 67 (E.D. Va. 1981).
82. Id.
83. See Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 450 (4th Cir.
1982).
84. 510 F. Supp. at 70.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977); Floor Debate on S. 995,
123 CONG. REC. 29,640-65 (1977), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY
DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978, at 38, 43 (1979)).
88. 510 F. Supp. at 71.
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that McNulty and his wife were not entitled to additional benefits under
the Act and, accordingly, dismissed the EEOC's complaint. 9
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
heralded recognition of the family unit in the pregnancy benefits area.90 A
divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that
if spousal coverage is provided, an employer's insurance program must cover
equally the medical expenses of the spouses of both male and female
employees, including pregnancy-related expenses."' Describing the Newport
News and district court interpretations of the PDA as "tortured," 9 2 the court
held that the PDA did not limit the provision of disability benefits to female
employees and applicants for employment, but included female spouses as
well. The court observed that an employer extends medical benefits to spouses
to serve an employment-related purpose.93 Because including spouses serves
an employment-related purpose, the spouse so included implicitly must be
protected by Title VII. Further, according to the Fourth Circuit, the statute
did not preclude benefits payable to an employee for the disability of a
spouse.' Finally, the court reasoned that the spouse's "ability or inability
to work" does not require that the spouse be an employee of the company
providing the benefits.9
The district court had concluded that the PDA did not resolve the ques-
tion of dependents' benefits, and therefore, pre-PDA principles were invoked
to decide the issue.9 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit determined that even
if the Senate Committee did not specifically address the issue, the question
need not be decided by application of pre-PDA principles. 7 The court stated
that although Congress left the specific issue to be resolved through litiga-
tion, such a judicial determination must be based on the statute as it existed
at the time the case arose.' 8 Accordingly, the court declared that the PDA
was an integral part of Title VII at the time the discrimination in Newport
News occurred and, consequently, could not be ignored in deciding the case.99
By applying the PDA in Newport News, the appellate court protected the
male employee from reverse discrimination and acknowledged a male
employee's financial obligation to his wife's pregnancy. The Fourth Circuit's
recognition of the mutual responsibilities of the employee and his wife in
their pregnancy provided the basis for the family unit concept subsequently
adopted by the Supreme Court.
89. Id.
90. Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1982).
91. Id. at 450-51.
92. Id. at 450.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 450-51.
96. According to the district court, the pre-PDA standards were the "existing Title VII
principles" developed in Aiello and Gilbert. 510 F. Supp. at 71.
97. 667 F.2d at 451.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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The Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court held that the Newport News disability
plan violated the PDA because it did not provide male employees' wives
with the same pregnancy-related benefits as were enjoyed by female
employees.' In considering whether the exclusion of pregnancy-related
coverage for spouses of male employees constituted discrimination on the
basis of sex, the Court initially observed that it was necessary to examine
how "discriminate" is defined in the Title VII context.'"' The Court noted
that the sex discrimination protection of Title VII traditionally had been
for the benefit of women. Therefore, in order to determine whether the
Newport News plan discriminated on the basis of sex against male employees,
the Court had to look beyond the bare language of the statute' 2 to congres-
sional intent, both express and implied, and scrutinize the post-PDA viability
of the Gilbert test of discrimination.
Observing that the Gilbert decision provided the major impetus for the
enactment of the PDA, 3 the Newport News Court acknowledged that the
Aiello test was developed to construe the fourteenth amendment's equal pro-
tection clause.' Consequently, the Court concluded that the Gilbert Court
had used the wrong test of discrimination and had decided incorrectly that
no Title VII violation existed.' °0 The Newport News Court discussed with
approval the reasoning of the dissenting Justices in Gilbert.'"" The Court
cited the dissenting opinions to emphasize the erroneous analysis in Gilbert. 07
The Newport News Court relied on Justice Brennan's risk inclusion/exclu-
sion comparison to explain why the General Electric plan was discriminatory.
This comparison highlighted how the Gilbert majority had used an
inappropriate test to avoid finding prima facie discrimination and
discriminatory impact.' Justice Stevens had maintained in Gilbert that the
Court avoided the appropriate test by pitting two inappropriate classes against
each other.00 Hence, to indicate that the Gilbert Court made improper com-
parisons in a Title VII case, the Newport News Court quoted Justice Stevens:
"It is not accurate to describe the program as dividing potential recipients
into two groups, pregnant women and non-pregnant persons. . . . [T]he
appropriate classification was 'between persons who face a risk of pregnancy
and those who do not.""'0
Finally, the Court referred to the dissents' conclusions in Gilbert. Under
100. Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 103 S. Ct. 2622, 2632 (1983).
101. Id. at 2626-27. "Discriminate" had not been defined in the PDA or in Title VII.
102. Id. at 2627.
103. Id. at 2627-28.
104. Id. at 2627.
105. Id. at 2628.
106. Id. at 2627-28.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 429 U.S. 125, 161. n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. 103 S. Ct. at 2628.
[Vol. 33:545
NEWPORT NEWS V. EEOC
General Electric's plan, men were compensated for all types of risks, including
those which were male-oriented, while women received only partial protec-
tion. The dissenting Justices in Gilbert contended that this amounted to
discrimination on the basis of sex because "conditions of employment for
females were less favorable than for similarly situated males.'" In
emphasizing the analyses of the Gilbert dissents, the Newport News Court
showed that the situation before it was the mirror-image of Gilbert.' 2
As additional support for its decision, the Newport News Court cited the
House Report'' 3 which stated: "It is the committee's view that the dissenting
Justices [in Gilbert] correctly interpreted the Act."' Because those dissenters
objected to both the Gilbert majority's analysis as well as its result, and
the Committee expressly approved of the dissenting Justices' views during
debate on the PDA, the Newport News Court concluded that the PDA over-
turned both the holding and the reasoning of Gilbert.' " The Court stated
that this repudiation of Gilbert signaled a return to the principles of Title
VII as they had been legislatively intended and judicially construed prior
to Gilbert."6 The Court emphasized that the PDA had been enacted to
guarantee that Gilbert's erroneous construction would not reoccur." 7
Accordingly, the Court summarily dismissed Newport News's argument
that Congress was concerned with the needs of female employees, rather
than with those of male employees' spouses. In its analysis, the Court initially
observed that statutes apply to problems other than those for which they
originally were enacted." 8 The Court further reasoned that because disability
insurance programs usually do not present the problem found in the Newport
News plan, Congress apparently did not believe that the matter warranted
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2632.
113. H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4749, 4750, and in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT
OF 1978, at 147, 148 (1979).
114. 103 S. Ct. at 2628.
115. The dissent, however, objected to this point. The dissent maintained that the PDA over-
turned Gilbert only on its specific, narrow holding that disability plans that are otherwise all-
inclusive may exclude pregnancy-related risks. 103 S. Ct. at 2635 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
According to Justice Rehnquist, it was not Congress' intent to extend PDA protections to male
employees with pregnant wives. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Newport News majority,
therefore, incorrectly interpreted Congress' modification of the Gilbert result to mean that Gilbert
was entirely obsolete. Id. at 2636 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stated that the
Gilbert analysis was still viable to the extent that it permitted exclusion of pregnancy benefits
to any group except female employees. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Con-
gress' intent regarding the scope of the PDA, see infra notes 131-45 and accompanying text.
For a full discussion of Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion, see infra note 141.
116. 103 S. Ct. at 2628.
117. Id. The Court noted the comments of various legislators who believed the PDA was
not a substantive addition to Title V11, but merely confirmed the prior meaning of Title Vii.
Id. at 2628-29 & n. 17.
118. Id. at 2629-30.
1984]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
discussion." 9 Proponents of the PDA emphasized that the legislative intent
behind Title VII had always been to protect all individuals from sex
discrimination in employment. 2 According to the Court, this protection in-
cluded, but was not limited to, pregnant female workers.''
The Newport News Court then introduced its family unit analysis. The
Court discerned that a male employee's spouse, although not directly involved
in an employment relationship with her husband's employer, was financially
affected by her husband's benefits plan. If the husband was denied compen-
sation for his wife's pregnancy-related medical expenses, then he was a victim
of sex discrimination. By adopting this analysis, the Court widened the scope
of Title VII protection to include an employee on the basis of a non-
employee's disability.
The Court then focused on the Newport News disability plan. To
demonstrate the invidiousness of the employer's actions, the Court discussed
the plan's discrepancies in less controversial terms by analogizing coverage
for the risk of pregnancy to coverage for broken bones.' 22 The Court stated
that providing coverage for the broken bones of female employees' spouses,
but not for male employees' spouses, would violate Title VII by discriminating
against male employees. Comparing the broken bone analogy to pregnancy-
related coverage for spouses of male and female employees, the Court implied
that it could no longer use a simple point-by-point comparison of risks that
all spouses have in common, since some disabilities afflict only women while
others afflict only men. The Court indicated that it was inappropriate to
compare the coverage of dependent spouses in order to determine whether
male and female spouses received identical coverage. Rather, the appropriate
comparison was between the entire benefits package provided to a female
employee and her spouse, and the entire package provided to a male employee
and his spouse to determine whether there was equality of coverage.' 23 The
Court concluded that the unfairness of the Newport News plan was
demonstrated by the fact that it provided less than full coverage for female-
unique conditions (i.e., pregnancy) in the male employee package, but pro-
vided full coverage for male-unique treatment (e.g., vasectomies, prostatec-
tomies) in the female employee package.' 24
Building on this analysis, the Court articulated a bifurcated analysis to
ensure that the safeguards of Title VII and the PDA are extended to pregnant
spouses. First, the Court stated that the PDA makes clear that discrimina-
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2630.
121. Id. The Court cited with approval the remarks of Sen. Williams: "(Tihe Court has
ignored the congressional intent in enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act - that intent was
to protect all individuals from unjust employment discrimination, including pregnant workers."
123 CONG. REC. 29,385-652 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
122. 103 S. Ct. at 2631.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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tion based on pregnancy is prima facie sex-based discrimination. ' The Court
preferred the "but for" test set forth in City of Los Angeles Department
of Water & Power v. Manhart:'26 Discrimination is treatment which "but
for that person's sex would be different.""'2 Thus, the Court essentially
rejected the test for discrimination adopted in Aiello and Gilbert.
The second part of the Newport News analysis is the heart of the family
unit concept. The Court stated that discrimination against an employee's
pregnant spouse in the provision of fringe benefits necessarily amounts to
discrimination against the employee himself, because a pregnant woman's
spouse is always a male.'28 In this part of its analysis, the Court implicitly
recognized that disability discrimination toward spouses has a financial im-
pact on the family, causing a loss not only to the spouse but also to the
employee.' 9 This husband/wife or family unit analysis' 30 introduced a new
concept in sex discrimination and widened the spectrum of individuals entitled
to protection under Title VII.
125. Id.
126. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
127. Id. at 711 (quoting Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1170 (1971)). The Los Angeles
Water and Power Department's pension plan required that females make larger contributions
to the fund than males. This requirement was based on mortality tables and the department's
own experience, which indicated that women had greater longevity than men. The cost of pen-
sion payments, therefore, was greater for the average woman because she would receive more
monthly payments after retirement than the average min.
The Supreme Court held that the contribution differential violated Title VII. 435 U.S. at
707-18. The Court reasoned that the differential was discriminatory because of its "treatment
of a person in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different." Id. at 711.
According to the Court, Title VII protects individuals, not classes, and thus prohibits treating
persons merely as components of a class. Id. at 709. Even if women generally do outlive men,
it is wrong to use that generalization in the case of an individual woman to whom it may
not apply. Id. at 710.
o In 1983, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Manhart decision in Arizona Governing Comm.
v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983). In Norris, the employer offered its workers the option of
receiving pension benefits from one of several insurance companies, all of which paid women
lower monthly benefits than men. The Supreme Court held, in a per curiam opinion, that
the classification of employees on the basis of sex is no more permissible at the receiving stage
of a retirement plan than at the contribution stage, and therefore, the plan violated Title VII.
Id. at 3497.
The Court in Norris applied the Manhart "but for" test. If a woman wished to receive
monthly benefits equal to those obtained by a man, the Court noted that she would have to
make greater monthly contributions than a man, just as the female employees in Manhart were
required to make greater contributions to obtain equal benefits. Id. Both the Norris and Manhart
plans were discriminatory because they treated women as components of a class, rather than
as individuals. In applying the class generalization of greater longevity for women, the employer
treated each woman in a manner which, but for her sex, would have been different. Id.
128. 103 S. Ct. at 2631.
129. See infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
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ANALYSIS AND IMPACT OF THE NEWPORT NEWS DECISION
As a starting point for its analysis, the Newport News Court examined
the legislative intent underlying the PDA. The Court concluded that Con-
gress' purpose in enacting the PDA was to protect pregnant women from
an employer's unlawful employment practices. Accordingly, the Court ex-
tended PDA protection to male employees for their wives' pregnancies. The
congressional debates, however, are vague with respect to Congress' posi-
tion on the scope of the Act's protection in a situation like that presented
in Newport News."' Although several opinions were voiced on both sides
of the issue, the predominant position was that the PDA protected only work-
ing female employees, and not the spouses of male employees. '32 The Court,
therefore, played an activist role by extending Title VII safeguards to preg-
nant non-employees.
The Newport News majority virtually ignored the comments of various
members of Congress who opposed extension of Title VII protection to preg-
nant spouses. The best example of such a comment is an exchange which
occurred between Senators Williams and Hatch.' Senator Hatch question-
ed Senator Williams, a proponent of the bill, about exactly which pregnant
131. 123 CONG. REC. 29,640-44 (1977).
132. The following comments indicate that members of Congress concentrated on the needs
of the nation's working women during its discussions of the PDA: "[The PDA] will end a
major source of discrimination unjustly afflicting working women in America." 124 CONG.
REc. 36,819 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Stafford); "[The bill] is necessary in order for women
employees to enjoy equal treatment in fringe benefit programs." id. at 21,439 (1978) (remarks
of Rep. Quie); "[The bill] will provide rights working women should have had years ago."
id. at 21,437 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Green); "[T]he bill simply requires that pregnant workers
be fairly and equally treated." 124 CONG. REC. H6867 (daily ed. July 18, 1978) (remarks of
Rep. Akaka).
Remarks indicating that the PDA intended spousal coverage for pregnancy are discussed infra
at notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
133. The Hatch-Williams exchange is quoted in pertinent part:
Mr. HATCH: [Tihe phrase "women affected by pregnancy, child birth or related
medical conditions," . . . appears to be overly broad, and is not limited in terms
of employment. It does not even require that the person so affected be pregnant,
Indeed, under the present language of the bill, it is arguable that spouses of
male employees are covered by this civil rights amendment. One might even argue
that other female dependents are covered. ...
Mr. WILLIAMS: [1] do not see how one can read into this any pregnancy other
than that pregnancy that relates to the employee. . . . It deals with a woman,
a woman who is an employee, an employee in a work situation where all disabilities
are covered under a company plan that provides income maintenance in the event
of medical disability; that her particular period of disability, when she cannot work
because of childbirth or anything related to childbirth is excluded. It is narrowly
drawn and would not give any employee the right to obtain income maintenance
as a result of the pregnancy of someone who is not an employee.
Mr. HATCH: [Tihis act only applies to the particular woman who is actually preg-
nant, who is an employee and has become pregnant after her employment?
Mr. WILLIAMS: Exactly.
123 CONG. REC. 29,643-44 (1977).
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women would be protected by the PDA. Senator Williams declared that the
statute would apply only to a pregnant woman who is an employee and
who becomes pregnant after the commencement of her employment." '
This exchange between Senators Williams and Hatch was the most ex-
plicit indication that Congress did not intend that the PDA apply to the
pregnancy of an employee's dependent. In addition, numerous statements
in the legislative history also implicitly indicated that the PDA was intended
to protect only pregnant working women. 3 ' While none of these comments
were made directly in response to questions about spousal coverage, they
consistently focused only on the rights and needs of working women.
Senators Bayh and Cranston made the only two comments which could
be construed to support the extension of PDA protection to spouses. Yet,
because of their tentative nature and context, these comments are poor in-
dicia of congressional intent. Senator Bayh's comment, made while discuss-
ing the potential impact of the PDA, addressed the issue of whether
dependents of male employees must receive full maternity coverage if the
spouses of female employees are provided complete medical coverage.' 36 Like
the Newport News Court, Senator Bayh answered in the affirmative.'37 He
made it clear, however, that the issue was one to be decided by the courts
and implied that such an issue should be decided under the fourteenth amend-
ment and Title VII principles which existed prior to Gilbert. Senator Bayh's
comment indicates his reluctance to present a firm congressional position
on the issue and furthermore is not as forceful as the Hatch-Williams ex-
change.
Senator Cranston's comment is substantively more persuasive because it
set forth the primary policy consideration implicit in the Newport News deci-
sion. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resourses did not ex-
pressly consider the issue of pregnancy coverage for dependents, the Senator
explained, because it presumed that dependents were covered under most
medical plans, and that if husbands of female employees were covered, it
was unlikely that wives of male employees would not be covered., Senator
134. Id. at 29,644.
135. See supra note 132.
136. Senator Bayh stated that the legislation would not require employers to provide the
same coverage for male employees' dependents as it provides to female employees. He noted,
however, that the legislation did not resolve the issue of whether dependents of male employees
must receive complete maternity coverage if the spouses of female employees are provided full
medical coverage. According to Senator Bayh, although it would be difficult to anticipate how
the courts would rule on the issue, the history of sex discrimination under the fourteenth amend-
ment and previous interpretations of Title VII regulations regarding the treatment of dependents
would require companies that provide full coverage to the dependents of female employees
to also provide complete coverage to the dependents of male employees. 123 CoNo. REC. 29,642
(1977) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
137. Id.
138. Senator Cranston stated that the Human Resources Committee, which considered how
the legislation would affect the medical coverage for employees' dependents, raised the ques-
tion of whether an employer would be obligated to cover the pregnancy-related medical ex-
penses of employees' spouses. The committee, however, did not reach a conclusion on the
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Cranston took for granted, and implied that the Committee did also, that
the typical medical plan covering dependent disabilities would do so equally
and equitably.' 39 He declared that a plan that did not cover male and female
spouses in such an equitable manner would be violative of Title VII and
would have "such antifamily ramifications ... totally inimical to the values
we hold so dear and which we, in these times, are attempting to
strengthen.' ' 4 Senator Cranston, however, made clear that this last state-
ment was his personal view. Furthermore, the comment does not outweigh
the explicitness of the Hatch-Williams exchange.
Thus, although the Newport News Court arrived at a result consistent with
the spirit of Title VII, the Court, contrary to its assertions, did not rely
on the legislative history of the PDA. This departure from the legislative
history left the majority opinion vulnerable to attack by Justice Rehnquist's
dissent. His objections were based completely on the PDA's legislative
history,' 4 ' and his dissent focused on the Hatch-Williams exchange to show
issue because it presumed that most comprehensive medical plans do cover dependents, and
that it would be unlikely that any such comprehensive plan would cover husbands of female
employees but not wives of male employees. The committee did not directly decide whether
providing coverage for female employees' spouses would violate Title VII. Id. at 29,663 (1977)
(remarks of Sen. Cranston).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist and joined in by Justice Powell,
maintained that the "individual" that the PDA protected under Title VII was only the employee
or applicant for employment. 103 S. Ct. at 2633 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The language,
"[blecause of such individual's pregnancy," could be construed, therefore, only as referring
to the pregnancy of an employee. The dissent asserted that the language, "women affected
by pregnancy . . . shall be treated the same . . . as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work," meant only female employees. The dissent did not ex-
plain, however, why Congress did not use the terms "pregnant employees" instead of "women,"
or "other employees" instead of "other persons." Id. at 2633 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The dissent supported its position by citing the two other circuit court decisions on the spousal
pregnancy disability issue, in which the courts reached the opposite conclusions of the Newport
News Court. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. and Supply Co.,
706 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1983) (court not bound by the EEOC's interpretation of the PDA;
Title VII does not require an employer to provide male employees with the same medical benefits
for their spouses' pregnancies as it provides for female employees' pregnancies); EEOC v.
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982) (PDA did not change the basic
Title VII principles as they existed prior to the enactment of the PDA, and therefore exclusion
of pregnancy-related coverage from disability plan was not gender-based discrimination in violation
of Title VII). For a discussion of Lockheed, see Note, Employment Discrimination, supra note
69, at 1037-40 (Lockheed holding failed because Congress intended to make all forms of
pregnancy-based discrimination unlawful and to overrule Gilbert through enactment of the PDA);
see also EEOC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 539 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (PDA is inap-
plicable to disability coverage for employees' dependents, and therefore, a plan that limits coverage
of pregnancy-related expenses for spouses while completely covering other medical expenses
of spouses, is not sexually discriminatory).
The dissent disagreed with the majority's declaration that the scope of the PDA need not
be confined to the specific problems that motivated its enactment. 103 S. Ct. at 2635 (Rehnquist,
[Vol. 33:545
NEWPORT NEWS V. EEOC
that the PDA was intended to apply only to pregnant workers. 4  The ma-
jority cited certain members of Congress, who agreed with the dissenters
in Gilbert. Justice Rehnquist, however, emphasized that the entire Congress
did not agree with the Gilbert dissents. 43 Furthermore, since the dissent in
Gilbert had not discussed a Newport News type situation, one could not
assume that the members of Congress who agreed with the Gilbert dissenters
would necessarily agree with the Newport News majority.
The Newport News Court could have based its decision on factors that
were more persuasive than legislative history. One such factor was the
statutory language of the PDA, which provided that "persons" rather than
"employees" are to be covered for pregnancy disability.' 44 The actual words
of a statute carry greater weight than any judicial construction of those
words.'4  The dissent's constructing the word "persons" to mean
"employees" would have narrowed the scope of the statute in contradiction
to its literal content.
Since the EEOC guidelines expressly require the result reached in Newport
News, the guidelines are yet another factor on which the Court could have
based its decision. The Newport News Court announced that the PDA had
entirely overruled the Gilbert opinion, in which the Court had refused to
follow previous EEOC guidelines. The overruling of Gilbert heralded a return
to pre-Aiello/Gilbert Title VII principles and, consequently, restored to the
J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stated that the majority's interpretation might have been viable
had the legislative history been silent regarding plans similar to the one at issue in Newport
News. The dissent focused on the senate report that posed the hypothetical question which
became the issue in Newport News. Whereas the majority suggested that the matter presumably
had not been addressed in Congress because Newport News-type plans were uncommon, the
dissent quoted from the legislative history: "It is certainly not this committee's desire to en-
courage the institution of such [Newport News-type] plans." Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting
S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1977),. reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978, at 42, 43 (1979)). The dissent contended that the
express desire not to encourage such plans cannot be construed as an intention to prohibit
that kind of plan. 103 S. Ct. at 2635 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Based on those factors, the dissent declared that the majority's analysis should have ended
at that point, and thus defining reverse discrimination was unnecessary. Id. at 2636 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). The dissent criticized the majority for adding judicial gloss to the meaning of
discrimination when Congress had not defined the term in the PDA or Title VII context. Id.
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 2635-36 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 2637 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
144. For the text of the PDA, see supra note 4.
145. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (4th ed. 1974).
The Plain Meaning Rule provides that the language in which the act is framed must be the
first source of the statute's meaning. If the meaning is clear, courts must apply the statute
according to its terms. The literal or obvious meaning of the statute, if in accordance with
the intent, subject-matter and context of the entire statute, is conclusive. Id.; see also De Sloovere,
Textual Interpretation of Statutes, 11 N.Y.U. L. REV. 538 (1933-34). The Golden Rule for
literal interpretation of statutes is to adhere to the ordinary meaning and grammatical con-
struction of the words, unless they are manifestly absurd or repugnant, or are at variance with
the intention of the legislature. If such is the case, the meaning of the language may be varied
or modified so as to avoid inconvenience, but no further. Id. at 546.
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EEOC the authority it had previously enjoyed. The 1979 guidelines 21 and
22 thus represent a post-Gilbert rebirth of pre-Aiello/Gilbert policies.
Although the Newport News Court's definition of pregnancy-based
discrimination as unlawful gender-based discrimination conformed with the
broad congressional purpose underlying the PDA,'46 the Court's construc-
tion of the PDA appears to have transcended Congress' specific legislative
intent. According to the Court, since employees, as well as their spouses,
are considered financially responsible for their pregnancies, the scope of the
PDA must be read to require that male employees receive the same pregnancy
benefits as their female colleagues. The Court's conclusion is supported by
the Senate Report which states that where pregnancy coverage is
discriminatorily excluded from insurance plans, women are compelled to pay
their own medical bills, " 7 and therefore, are essentially being paid less than
men for the same work. "' Consistent with this reasoning, the Newport News
Court employed the disparate treatment test of discrimination: whether
similarly situated employees were treated comparably.' The Court correctly
concluded that the male employees were victims of reverse discrimination.
The Newport News holding represents a progressive approach to the defini-
tion of discrimination. The Court did not view the employee and spouse
as separate entities with separate burdens. Instead, it implicitly established
the employee and spouse as a husband/wife unit'50 that copes as a team
146. For statements to the effect that pregnancy-based discrimination is discrimination on
the basis of sex, see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978,
at 168 (1979) (remarks of Rep. Sarasin, July 18, 1978); id. at 134 (remarks of Sen. Mathias,
Sept. 16, 1977); id. at 73 (remarks of Sen. Bayh, Sept. 16, 1977); id. at 67 (remarks of Sen.
Javits, Sept. 15 1977); id. at 24 (remarks of Rep. Hawkins, Apr. 5, 1977); id. at 18 (remarks of
Sen. Bayh, Mar. 18, 1977); see also Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977: Hearings
on S. 995 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 37, 51 (1977) (statement of Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, Drew
S. Days); id. at 13 (statement of Sen. Bayh).
147. S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978, at 42 (1979).
148. Note, Employment Discrimination, supra note 69, at 1040.
149. 103 S. Ct. 2622, 2631 (1983). By deeming pregnancy discrimination as prima facie sex
discrimination, the Court eliminated the need for a disparate impact analysis in pregnancy
discrimination cases. The "but for" test articulated in City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978), was a disparate treatment test and was adopted
by the Newport News Court. 103 S. Ct. at 2631; see also supra note 127 and accompanying text.
150. The husband/wife unit or family unit analysis may be viewed as having two components:
(1) If an employer's disability plan excludes or reduces coverage to the spouse for a sex-unique
disability, there would be discrimination on the basis of sex. (2) The cost of the spouse's uncovered
disability would financially burden the employee. That employee's family would suffer a monetary
loss. The same sex-unique disability, when suffered by an employee, would not be a financial
burden because the disability would be completely covered for the employee. That employee's
family would not suffer a financial loss. The total benefit packages would have an unequal
financial effect on the two employees' families. The packages would be unequal solely because
the employees are of different sexes. Such an inequality would amount to discrimination on
the basis of sex between employees and would be violative of Title VII.
The husband/wife unit analysis may be illustrated by a hypothetical situation that reverses
the circumstances in Newport News: If the husband of a female employee is not covered to
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with financial burdens, such as medical expenses. Consequently, an employer's
decision regarding the provision of maternity benefits is not a choice for
or against women, but one for or against childbearing family units. Thus,
an employer's refusal to provide benefits to either spouse constitutes
discrimination against both spouses and against the family unit."'
By including the concept of the husband/wife or family unit in Title VII
analysis, the Court halted a type of tyranny perpetuated by the majority
of employees against themselves. One commentator presaged the significance
of a Newport News type situation by eight years, and articulated the con-
cept as follows:
[S]ince childbearing family units constitute the great majority of family
units (past, present or prospective), any broad policy disfavoring such units
is a decision not by a majority or a superior against a minority, but by
a majority against themselves. It is appropriate to speak of broad policy
here, since the pattern of priorities in fringe benefits here at stake has
been set, not on a narrow plan-by-plan basis, but on a basis of almost
universal union, employer, and governmental consensus. In short, the cor-
rect mental picture is not that of a biased employer deliberately
discriminating against women, but rather that of an entire industrial society,
dominated by present or prospective childbearing family units, deliberate-
ly discriminating against childbearing family units, by deciding that they
would rather have a given fixed fringe benefit resource applied to disabili-
ty from sickness and injury than to disability from pregnancy.' 2
The Newport News Court thus lessened the possibility of a majority in
an industrial society imposing discriminatory medical benefit plans upon fami-
ly units through collective bargaining agreements. It is reasonable to assume
that female employees will not, absent coercion or pressure, bargain away
their pregnancy insurance rights. Most women in the labor force are of
childbearing age,' 3 and therefore, would suffer economically if they volun-
tarily relinquished their pregnancy insurance rights. After Newport News,
if disability coverage is provided for employees' spouses, then female spouses
must receive pregnancy benefits equal to those received by female employees.
Thus, if pregnancy rights are retained for female employees, they must be
retained for all employees.
The Newport News rationale, if carried to its logical end, dictates that
an employer who provides full medical benefits for its employees must also
provide pregnancy benefits for its employees' spouses. It is important to
the same extent as a male employee for a male-unique disability, such as prostate surgery,
the female employee would receive a benefit package inferior to that received by a male employee,
and her family would suffer a financial loss. The cost of the male employee's prostate surgery,
however, would be covered and his family would not suffer a financial loss.
151. See Larson, supra note 69, at 819.
152. Id. at 819-20.
153. Eighty percent of American women become pregnant in their working years; 400 of
all pregnant women are employed during their pregnancy; and almost 40% of mothers with
children under six years of age are employed. 123 CONG. REC. 29,385 (1977) (remarks of Sen.
Williams).
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emphasize that although employers are not required to provide insurance
benefits for their employees, the provision of such benefits is necessary for
an employer to remain competitive in a modern industrial society. 54 In fact,
disability insurance for employees and their dependents is now commonly
viewed as an integral part of the employees' salary rather than a fringe
benefit."' If an employer provides any disability insurance coverage to its
employees, that coverage must include pregnancy coverage for female
employees. '5 6 Accordingly, under the husband/wife unit analysis an employee's
pregnant spouse must also be covered, even if the benefits plan does not
expressly include coverage for dependents. According to the husband/wife
unit analysis, the disability for the bearer of the child is simultaneously a
disability for the father of the child-the male employee. In short, accor-
ding to Newport News, a pregnancy in the family is a compensable disabili-
ty for the employee, whether male or female. The spouse's pregnancy,
therefore, must be compensated even in the absence of disability insurance
for dependents.
This analysis essentially places pregnancy-related risks in a preferred
classification, because pregnancy would be the only disability to carry an
irrebuttable presumption of an inter-spousal effect for which the employee
would always be compensated. It is questionable whether the Newport News
Court intended to substitute one type of preference for another. If that was
the Court's intention, then the discrimination against female spouses/male
employees based on pregnancy benefits would be replaced by discrimination
in favor of pregnancy over all other disabilities. If such substitution of
preferential treatment is not what the Court intended, then to prevent prefer-
red status for pregnancy, employers would be required to provide totally
comprehensive coverage. An employer would bear a heavy burden in at-
tempting to prove that an employee did not suffer financially from his or
her spouse's medical disability. If this latter interpretation of Newport News
is correct, then the Court has effectively eliminated all distinctions between
spousal and employee disability coverage.
Newport News, however, is perhaps most significant for its effect on
employers' insurance cost allocation. Although it is beyond the scope of this
Note to analyze the solutions to the cost-allocation problems which would
154. See Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 450 (4th Cir.
1982). The Court stated that employers have the same "employment-related purpose" when
considering extension of medical benefits to employees' spouses as when they consider exten-
sion of these benefits to employees themselves. Employees would not extend such benefits if
it did not serve an employment-related purpose. Id.
155. See H.R. REP. No. 6075, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1977) (dissenting views of Rep.
Weiss on anti-abortion language in the bill). Health benefits, like wages and other fringe benefits,
are earned by the employee. They are not gifts from the employer to the employee. Id.
156. According to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, supra note 4, if employees' disabilities
are to be compensated, then pregnancy disability must be compensated. Pregnancy must be
compensated to the same extent as a different disability that incapacitates to the same degree
as pregnancy.
[Vol. 33:545
1984] NEWPORT NEWS V. EEOC
inevitably arise from requiring employers to provide total coverage, one of
the controversies regarding these financial burdens can be identified. An ob-
vious problem is that the cost of totally comprehensive coverage could ex-
ceed the benefit to the employer of using attractive disability benefits to
recruit employees. Consequently, employers might eliminate these benefits.'"
Increased costs, however, could be defrayed by increasing employee con-
tributions to the insurance programs. This method would only sustain the
competitive aspect of offering insurance benefits if a substantial number of
employers in a given industry could not afford comprehensive disability in-
surance for employees and their spouses. Such a method is similar to that
utilized by nations with socialized medical plans which are funded by high
taxes.'"
Another alternative for the employer, rapidly becoming popular in the.
United States, would be to insure employees through a health maintenance
organization.'" Such a system would require an employer to pay a relative-
ly small insurance premium of equal size for each employee. Under this
system, the employee would make equal payments, also in advance, and
receive comprehensive family coverage.
A less attractive, but nevertheless viable, alternative would be to pass along
the increased expense of the employer's product or services to the general
public. The consumer, however, might object to higher costs for goods and
157. Consequently, when employer and employees, or their representatives, sit down at the
bargaining table, the provision of disability benefits is frequently an all-or-nothing proposition.
But see H.R. 6075, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977) (employer cannot discontinue existing insurance
plans until at least one year after enactment).
158. Many European countries' governments have assumed the economic responsibilities of
pregnancy and childbirth. See K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, TEXT, CASES AND MATERAIlS
ON SEX-BASED DISCRMINATION 504 (1974). Virtually all European countries have some form
of national health insurance system for employees, their spouses and dependents. Generally
these cover all medical expenses for childbirth and include at least a part of pre- and post-natal
medical expenses. For a discussion of governmentally-controlled health services in European
nations, see NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, THEIR IMPACT ON MEDICAL EDUCATION AND THEIR
ROLE IN PREVENTION (J. Bowers & E. Purcell ed. 1973) (countries discussed: Great Britian,
France, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Yugoslavia, Israel, India, Peoples Republic of China,
Japan, New Zealand, and the United States).
159. A health maintenance organization (HMO) is an organization responsible for the provi-
sion of comprehensive health services to enrolled persons in return for an established monthly
premium. F. WILSON & D. NEUHAUSER, HEALTH SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES 112 (2d
ed. 1982). The concept of prepaid group health care has existed for almost a century, but
the term "health maintenance organization" dates to the early 1970's. During the Nixon
administration the federal government supported and encouraged development of HMOs as
an alternative to traditional health care. Today, HMOs are probably the most rapidly expand-
ing health care system in the country. R. NUMEROF, THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT FOR HEALTH
CARE PROFESSIONALS 79 (1982).
The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 defined the HMO as an organized system
of health care that either provides or arranges the provision of a comprehensive range of basic
and supplemental health care services to its enrollees on a prepaid basis. Id. Health Maintenance
Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (1973) (amended 1976, 1978, 1981).
For a discussion of the provisions of these amendments, see F. WILSON & D. NEUHAUSER,
supra, at 208-11.
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services to support and encourage reproduction and to pay for other
disabilities incurred by employees and their dependents. Yet, such an objec-
tion would be unfounded because a distinction should not be drawn bet-
ween family-oriented medical costs and other labor-related costs, which also
ultimately drive up the price consumers must pay for goods and services.'
6
1
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Newport News has far-reaching con-
sequences. Primarily, by returning to the spirit of Title VII that flourished
prior to Gilbert, the Court endeavored to protect women, victims of tradi-
tional societal discrimination, from further discrimination perpetrated against
their husbands. Every pregnancy involves a man as well as a woman. Where
maternity benefits are granted, the father receives a direct economic benefit;
where they are withheld, he bears a direct financial burden.' 6 ' In most situa-
tions, Newport News will prevent "pregnant families" from becoming victims
of sex discrimination.
Harriet Beth Robbins-Ost
160. See Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 40 (1975). "We
will continue to shortchange parents, particularly mothers, and children until childrearing burdens
are distributed more evenly among parents, their employers and the tax-paying public." Id.
161. Larson, supra note 69, at 819.
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